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Historical analysis suggests that in the short to medium term, dollarization as a monetary 
policy measure, post a period of high inflation, reduces economic volatility, stabilises the 
inflation of goods and services, and restores economic predictability. However, in fully 
dollarized economics (as opposed to dual currency economies,) in the medium term, the 
effects of dollarization do not create a suitable environment for long term sustainable 
growth. This paper discusses the benefits and challenges of full dollarization and 
suggests a further policy measure of re-introducing the local currency through a 
managed regime. The paper looks to smoothing out money supply volatility through 
Zimbabwe dollar introduction. Understanding the responsiveness of the economy to 
monetary liquidity is explained through theoretical and extrapolative statistical analysis 
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In terms of dollarized economies, Zimbabwe presents a unique example in that it is a 
fully dollarized economy, as opposed to most other examples which are dualised 
economies and maintain a local currency in circulation, albeit that it may have little 
confidence or value. Formal dollarization was implemented in February 2009 as a 
measure designed to contain inflation and restore economic predictability and confidence, 
post a period of high inflation and volatility. The background and context of this is 
explored to understand the causes of high de-facto dollarization in the 2000s leading to 
formal implementation of a multi-currency environment.  
 
In an effort to explain the economic condition of a fully dollarized Zimbabwe, analysis is 
made of national economic indicators, which highlight the state of the economy pre and 
post dollarization. The data shows that pre-dollarization, economic volatility, measured 
through changes in GDP, was significantly higher than the period post implementation of 
a multi-currency regime. The results are not surprising as the short-term economic impact 
post formal dollarization, is well documented and will be explored further. However, we 
aim to understand the effect on the medium term; using Year 4 and Year 5 as our 
measure for ‘medium’ term (this is due to the subject country in question and the number 
of years under which the country has operated under dollarization).  Within this period 
we witness a lack of growth in GDP, along with evidence of slowing inflation and 
explain some of the regional linkages.  
 
This paper will highlight the constraints that exist within a dollarized economy that has 
limited links with the owner of the common currency. Findings suggest that the 
Zimbabwean economy has strong economic ties with Europe, South Africa and China 
and, to a lesser extent, the United States and former colonial parent Great Britain. This is 
evident through analysis of the relationship between price movements (Consumer Price 
Indices) and currency movements, which provide perspective on the relationship between 
the local economy and parent country. The results also give possible suggestion of a 
solution in terms of joining a common currency area (CCA), as well as also highlighting 
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possible risks of CCA in terms of inflation risk, and sovereign risk of the neighbour.  
 
We will explore a suggested policy that entails the reintroduction of the Zimbabwe Dollar 
(ZWD) tied to a common commodity standard (gold), sourced locally. This policy could 
potentially facilitate an environment where measured monetary policy could provide the 
required economic confidence and support to restore interest rate discovery. This 
suggestion is made on the assumption that confidence in state institutions is restored.  
This paper creates and proposes a model to reintroduce the ZWD and shows the workings 
of possible dollarization along with increases in money supply which in effect should 
smooth Money Supply volatility. This policy measure would allow the central bank to 
reassume its other role of managing money supply through a decisive and independent 
monetary policy, reassuming its role of lender of last resort.  
 
Due to the economic context of this paper, we briefly explore the political and legislative 
encumbrances that have challenged the possible economic reinvigoration of the 
Zimbabwean economy and those that caused economic compromise in the first place. 
This provides us with perspective on the drivers of currency liquidity and subsequently 




2. BACKGROUND: ZIMBABWE CURRENCY ENVIRONMENT 
 
In order to understand dollarization and de-dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy 
one has to address how and why such drastic policy measures were implemented. We aim 
to do this by exploring how the Zimbabwean economy appeared at a point in time, and 
what possible measures would be needed to succeed rampant hyperinflation. This paper 
aims to present the most implicit causes of Zimbabwe’s dollarization. It is impossible to 
avoid addressing the political context in explaining the rise of US dollar use in the 
Zimbabwean economy. Best measures are taken not to over politicise or create bias, the 
approach intended on this analysis is subjective; however, in explaining a possible 
solution some objectivity is required. 
 
2.1. Historical Economic Performance and Policy from 1960 
Post the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, sanctions were imposed 
on Rhodesia, and the then government’s response was to foster a policy of self-
sufficiency, where large scale investments were made which promoted the diversification 
of the Zimbabwean economy. However during this period to 1980, the liberation struggle 
intensified and growth measured through GDP declined. After independence, Zimbabwe 
experienced economic growth greater than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa at an average 
of 5.5% from 1980 to 1990.1 This was influenced by favourable domestic and external 
conditions, including the lifting of economic sanctions, stimulation of overall demand in 
the economy with redistributive fiscal policies, and the opening up of external markets. 
Thereafter, towards the end of 1990s, growth was characterized by periods of economic 
booms and busts corresponding to periods of good weather or severe drought (AFDB, 
2010).  
                                                        




Figure 1 Source AFDB, 2010  
 
At the end of the 1990s, economic performance began to wane, partly due to internal 
policy inconsistencies. The period was characterised by low investment, declining 
manufacturing production, and rising unemployment, along with foreign exchange 
shortages (AFDB, 2010). Between 1989 and 2000 three major economic events took 
place. Firstly, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP) promoted by the 
IMF and World Bank saw the government dispose of a number of state owned assets, 
which at the time made significant contributions to the state coffers. Secondly, the 
unplanned balloon payment of ZWD50, 000 to 300,000 war veterans, and lastly, the 
policy of land appropriation which resulted in violent farm invasions across the country. 
All these put a significant strain on an already expanding budget deficit and are the most 
fundamental causes of Zimbabwe’s “lost decade”.2 Additionally, further impacts included 
lost foreign investment, withdrawal of foreign aid, and lower tax revenues.  
                                                        
2 Lost Decade: Used to describe the period between 2000 and 2009 where Zimbabwe GDP fell 51% to 




Figure 2: Disbursement by Multilateral Financial Institutions 
Source RBZ 2012 
 
The political discourse around this time shows a number of commentators according 
blame to gross economic mismanagement which arguably had implications on foreign 
investment perceptions, precipitating into further economic decline, as indicated in Figure 
2. 
 
Between 2000 and 2009 the economic contraction escalated. Zimbabwe’s economic crisis 
was so deep that it set the country back more than half a century. To illustrate this,  in 
1950s the then-Southern Rhodesia had an average income of $760 per year (in constant 
1990 US$ at purchasing power parity rates) by mid-2005 the average Zimbabwean 
income had fallen back to that level, wiping out the income gains over the past 52 years 




Figure 3 Source, CGDEV 2005 
 
With lower tax revenues, failing manufacturing, and exports that declined by half  within 
the period, the Reserve Bank repeatedly devalued the ZWD. This was further fuelled by 
the governments reliance on the monetary machine to subsidise its deficit gap. Zimbabwe 
recorded inflation increases of 231 million percent in July 2008, the highest ever recorded 
level of inflation. Added to that was the depletion of Zimbabwe’s educated workforce, as 
many emigrated in search of better living conditions and incomes.  
 
The role of the agricultural sector needs to be highlighted to explain Zimbabwe’s 
economic collapse and the rise of dollarisation as it is directly related to the context of 
this paper. Agricultural exports were historically the largest contributor to the current 
account. Zimbabwe was often referred to as the “bread basket of Africa”, due to the fact 
that the country, since independence, was a net exporter of food commodities. In 
addition, this sector historical employed over 60% of the population -  a figure that still 
stands today. The financial sector was heavily exposed to the agro-economy, through 
wage deposits, asset leasing and financing, and mortgage lending. As agricultural 
productivity declined, so did financial sector performance.  
 
2.2. Time inconsistency and lack of credibility of monetary policy 
 
As with Latam countries, time inconsistency of the reserve bank can partly account for 
defacto dollarisation that occurred pre-policy implementation. The systematic use of 
monetary surprise as a means of both promoting economic activity and reducing the real 
value of public debt, eroded the credibility of monetary policy, arguably keeping 
Zimbabwe in a high inflation environment (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Calvo 1978). 
Abuse of the exchange rate system along with sharp depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar 
generated an additional reason to hold US dollars (Licandro and Licandro, 2003). Thus 




2.3. Financial Sector 
 
Since the formal introduction of mulitcurrencism inflation has come under control, 
speculative activities in financial markets have abated, and the predictive ability of 
investors has been restored. Growth since dollarisation measured as Real GDP has 
improved from low base, however many economic challenges remain, some which mimic 
the environment between 2003 – 2009. Both periods (pre and post multicurrency system) 
experienced the following challenges; lack of fiscal space, liquidity shortages, and 
indiscipline in the banking sector (RBZ, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4 Source. RBZ and Zimstats 2012 
 
Due to low capacity utilisation measured at 50% in 2011 and a lack of long term capital 
commitements, Zimbabwe has become increasingly import dependent (RBZ, 2012).  An 
inability to respond to shocks such has droughts, continues to add strain to the current 
account deficit as imports rise in order to compensate for low domestic production. 
Furthermore, the capital account gains are insufficient to offset the deterioration in 
balance of payments, meaning that the domestic economy is starved of foreign exchange 





Figure 5 Source - Ministry of Finance Zimbabwe, 2011 
 
While loan growth continues to rise, deposits remain volatile with short term deposits 
accounting for 90% of all deposits, as indicated in Figure 5 above. This can partly be 
explained by a lack of trust in financial institutions and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(RBZ), but also the nature of the economy suggests that funds are used mainly for 
consumption rather than savings, thus deposits rarely spend a long time in the bank 
(Noko, 2011). In addition, interest rates offerred by financial institutions are not 
providing enough of an incentive for savers, with further disincentives created by high 
banking fees.  
 
Liquidity, as a key theme of this paper, needs to be historically contexualised. There are 
numerous  reasons for the demise of Zimbabwe’s financial economy. In explaining the 
cause of the demise, some suggest political uncertainty, economic mismanagement, lack 
of financial reserves, a broken institution of contract and rights to property, or 
inconsistent monetary policy. This sets the stage for limited foreign inflows and portfolio 
investment inflows, limited domestic use of financial institutions, a non-existent money 
market used as the base for interest discovery, and low economic confidence. Thus, the 
Zimbabwean economy is at the whim of external factors. The Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) also had a significant impact, with a considerable amount of Zimbabweans (est 3 
million) now living in the developed world. Diaspora remittances have become crucial 
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for domestic economic performance and subsequently offshore economic outcomes fuel a 
weak liquidity environment – for instance in the case of low economic performance in 
developed Europe.  
 
Within the banking sector there has been disconcordance in deposit and lending rates 
which serves more as a disincentive to deficit and surplus economic units. A missing 
lender of last resort further promotes irregular interest rate conditions. Large banks have 
been quoting deposit rates ranging from 0.15% to 6%, with smaller banks quoting rates of 
between 8 and 16%  (RBZ, 2012). Lending rates similarly range from 5 – 35% for 




Figure 6: Average Lending Rates and 3 Month Deposit Rates and Average Spread 
Source. RBZ, Interims Monetary Policy Statement Updates 2009 - 2011 
 
Although the overall banking sector sees small improvements, this has not translated into 











































































































































criteria being short term in nature and dependent on stability of applicant cashflows. 
Unless the value of a physical asset can be accurately ascertained, banks are generally 
reluctant to accept it as collateral. This means that the middle space, such as small to 
medium enterprise cannot access capital funding that facilitates growth and expansion. 
This creates a gap in the market which has subsequently been filled by micro-lenders, 
who typically have lower information requirements and charge much higher lending rates 
over short timeframes. To date there  have been 172 microlending registrations. Presently 
the sector is under scrutiny, with incidence of rates as high as 50% per month being 
charged by some microfinance institutions. Aside from creating a highly indebted 
domestic economy, due to the moral hazards present in unbalanced economies, 
microlending also contributes to the illiquid nature of the economy. It does this by not 
creating savers, with high incidence of borrowings being used for consumptive and 
subsistence purposes, rather than wealth or capital formation. 
2.4. Short-Run Effects of Dollarisation in Zimbabwe 
 
Consumer Price Index 1980 -2012 
As mentioned earlier, Zimbabwean inflation prior to formal dollarisation reached 
phenomenal levels along with a similar experience in price volatility levels.  We identify 
three  periods which reflect consumer price performance and which provide evidence that 
post dollarisation  trend volatility, as measured by quarterly rolling changes in CPI, has 
declined.  
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Figure 9 Source Data. Source. RBZ, Interims Monetary Policy Statement Updates 2009 – 
2011,2012 
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The data clearly illustrates that under dollarisation inflation movements have been less 
agressive then in periods where the ZWD was in use. Dollarisation could account for the 
renewed stability as this was the most significant policy measure during the period.  
 
 
Figure 11 GDP Growth since 2009 
 
Analysis of the above graph illustrates the rise of GDP growth during two specific 
periods. The first is before formal dollarisation, where economic units pre-empted the 
policy shift and uncontrollable inflation pushed them toward the use of the other 
currency. Further rises are seen post the implementation of dollarisation.  Of greater 
relevance is the tappering off of growth in the dollarised environment. 
 
Money Supply and Inflation 
In the Zimbabwean environment, money supply explained very little movement in 
inflation. We conducted a regression analysis using monthly changes inflation as the 
dependent variable and M3 Money supply as the indenpendent variable – the result is an 
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  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.653901891 0.028163641 23.21794621 7.57E-23 
X Variable 1 -0.33922274 0.151538861 -2.238519773 0.031647 
Table 1 Source Data – RBZ Monthly Bullitens  
 
Figure 12 Stock Market Performance 2009 -2013 (Post Dollarisation) Bloomberg Data  
 
The graph above illustrates that the market has increased 5-fold since the introduction of 
multi-currencisim. Further supporting  the argument of stability created by dollarisation. 
Some confidence can be assessed to have returned to the stock market – with the ability 
to assess valuations of companies in semi stable environment. Prior this period (2009 -
2012) the levels of inflation are not reliable enough to accurately show market 
performance or listed company valuation metrics.  
 
2.5. Bringing Back the Zimbabwe Dollar  
 
Both the governor of the RBZ and the Minister of Finance concede that the current 
financial sector conditions are not satisfactory, though in hindsight dollarising was the 
most suitable policy measure. They both agree that a new order is required to ensure the 
continued recovery of the economy, but a stand-off exists on which policy measure will 
follow the present. The options that exists include; keeping the multicurrency regime and 
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fully dollarising, joining the Southern African Currency Union (SACU), waiting for a 
regional currency, and reintroduce the Zimbabwe dollar (Ministry of Finance, 2012).  
 
This paper supports the reintrodution of the ZWD through an asset backed refloat where 
Zimbabwe uses its gold royalties as a reserve upon which the ZWD are issued as legal 
tender. It must be stated that this paper is not suggesting the withdrawal of US dollars 
from circulation but rather the addition of Zimbabwean dollars that are backed by gold. 
The immediate question that arises is the volatility of the gold price, which will impact 
the value of the reserves. We  propose a market related derivative strategy that is a barrier 
or collared option as this will protect the value of gold reserves within a range set by 
administrators. The second question is the relationship between increased money supply 
and inflation. This paper will look at the relationship between money supply, production 
demand, and inflation; arguing that if productive demand exists in excess then increases 
in money supply will be adequately absorbed by economic production needs. Thus 
theoretically having a net neutral effect on broad inflationary outcomes. Finally, the paper 
will discuss how bringing back the Zimbabwe dollar and creating a transparent and liquid 
interst rate and exchange rate environment will lead to de-dollarisation and improvements 
in economic prospects resulting in improved possibilities of economic growth.  
 
Again the biggest impediment to these suggestions will be the prevailing political 
environment which observationally is little equiped to implement such policy based on 
past irrationality. The model we build here leaves a small role for the Reserve Bank and 
because reserves are exposed to public markets, there can be no recourse to them by 
government that needs to sustain its expenditure, as was historically the case. This is the 
greatest point of contention and we are optimistic that this theoretical strategy can foster 
change even in the face of questionable political leadership. 
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3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Research Objective 
 
The objective of this research is to understand what constitutes an illiquid financial 
economy. The research aims to understand and show the impact of returning to a local 
currency standard, giving it a basis of trust through the use of a gold standard, allowing 
the economy to recover without overly impacting economic volatility. In other results, we 
seek to identify the relationship between the Zimbabwean economy and the economy of 
its neighbours by tracking the changes in inflation and growth. We also make comparison 
to a number of economies, highlighting the close relationship the ZWD has with the 
South African Rand (ZAR). We explore what the implication is of this relationship in a 
dollarized environment.  
 
3.2. Research Question  
 
Will reintroducing the Zimbabwe Dollar using a gold commodity standard improve the 
liquidity environment in Zimbabwe? 
3.2.1. Sub Research Questions 
3.2.1.1. Has financial dollarization increased economic volatility in         
Zimbabwe? 
3.2.1.2. To what extent is inflation in Zimbabwe determined by price 
movements in neighbouring countries? 
3.2.1.3. Will increases in money supply impact inflation in a Zimbabwe 
context? 
3.2.1.4. Can a barrier option protect against the effects of spot price 




3.3. Research Relevance  
By identifying the weaknesses in the dollarized or multi-currency environment – this 
research hopes to present a sustainable response which could reinvigorate economic 
growth in Zimbabwe. 
 
3.3.1. Relevance of this research is to identify weaknesses in the Zimbabwean 
financial economy that have the effect of increasing economic volatility. 
3.3.2. The levels of illiquidity are important in explaining the short-coming of 
financial intermediaries in funding the countries’ economic agent needs. 
3.3.3. The effect of increased money supply or lack there off is important to 
understand and is extremely relevant when implementing a policy of money 
supply reform and its subsequent impact on local inflation.  
3.3.4. As the use of a hedge has not been previously attempted, understanding 
the dynamics of the barrier option within the context of a commodity backed 




The research is informed by the following hypotheses; 
 
3.4.1. In the short term dollarization limits price volatility, restoring economic 
stability and predictability, as illustrated earlier in the volatility analysis. 
3.4.2. In the long term, full dollarization is ineffective in facilitating a liquid 
enough environment to meet the credit needs of a country, especially if there 
are limited economic links between the adopting country and the parent - in 
this instance Zimbabwe and the US. Use of the Rand may be better option 
based on the data analysis. 
3.4.3. Gold backed currency environments reflect long periods of price stability 
and economic stability. As gold is a finite resource, the rate of growth of 
gold production should ideally match economic growth (this is if gold is 
produced locally). When economic growth surpasses gold production, 
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money supply becomes constrained which can have deflationary effect on an 
economy when the peg is removed. 
3.4.4. Barrier options can be used to protect the value of a physical asset by 
ensuring that positive or negative movements in the gold price are covered. 
Barrier options ensure that underlying value of the asset remains the same. 





4. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Zimbabwe presents a unique case for two reasons; firstly, when dollarisation was 
legislated it was not backed by foreign reserves as the central bank had none, thus 
whatever ZWD balances were present were set to zero. Secondly, the ZWD was 
completely removed from circulation as opposed to more typical situations where a dual 
currency economy is created. The main challenges faced by Zimbabwe are not unique in 
the dollaristation discourse. Post multicurrency implementation, economic volatility has 
delcined, however, dollarisation has limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, due to 
the fact that the central bank cannot print its own currency (Ize and Yeyati, 2005). 
Another impact is lost seniorage due to not issuing local currency, with little ability to 
recoup lost revenue from issuer of foreign currency in most instances; limited economic 
links exist between the popular US dollar and Zimbabwe (Chang, 2000). Dollarisation 
also reduces the effeciency of payments, specifically in Zimbabwe, banknotes circulate at 
high rates resulting in questionable note quality and acceptance (Konkeyne et al., 2010). 
Dollarisation increases the likelilhood of a liquidity crisis, with the central bank unable to 
provide funding in the event of a bank run, this leaves foreign currency holders more 
prone to panic, a very visible characteristic in Zimbabwe (Chavez, 2012).  
 
A review of the  international experience of dedollarisation suggests that dollarisation is 
not easily reversed, even after underlying causes have been removed. They highlight that 
successful attempts to dedollarise have been market-based and combine a track record of 
macroeconomic stability with other policies to enhance the attactiveness of the local 
currency (Garcia-Escribano, 2010). Most of the literature on dollaristion makes reference 
to dual currency environments, we attempt to adapt this in order to explain the Zimbabwe 
multicurrency environment.3  
4.1. Currency Substitution, Asset Substitution, and Financial Dollarisation 
  
It is important to understand that Zimbabwe went through three transitions leading to 
implementation of dollarisation policy. As the economy disintegrated and the value of the 
                                                        
3 Dual currency means local currency and foreign currency concurrently used in the economy at the same 
time. Multicurrency means  the use of more than one currency 
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ZWD declined, currency substitution came into effect with more economic trades being 
conducted in foreign denominated currencies. Immediately following was asset substition 
where foreign denominated currency was used as a store of value, and finally a policy of 
financial dollarisation was implemented in 2009. In terms of the dynamics of money 
demand, as inflation rises dollaristion within an economy also increases, this is further 
accelerated by a lack of financial depth (Yeyati, 2005). Inflation is extremely relevant in 
this instance as it ties in exchange rates. For Zimbabwe, hyperinflation meant the 
exchange rates were a moving target with heightened speculativity. Any scheme to 
control the rate of inflation at a short horizon must control, to some extent, the nominal 
exchange rate (Chang and Velasco, 2000). The policy of dollarisation be it defacto or 
through policy, limited and killed both inflaiton and exhange rate volatitly respectively.  
 
Business and governments that hold local denominated debt in a rising inflation 
environment look to limit the costs of inflations and exchange by doing more of their 
business in foreign denominated currency or devaluing the local currency. In the case of 
governments, more debt related contractual arrangements are primarily structured taking 
interest rates into consideration as a risk measure, meaning that the depreciation of the 
currency is offset by changes in interest rates, more pertinent to the receiver of interest 
payments.(Yeyati, 2003). Eventually governments are forced to dollarise, in order to 
meet obligations but also to better manage tax revenues.  
 
4.2. De- Dollarisation Mechanism 
 
One of the most significant challenges of de-dollarising an economy arises from long 
lasting memories of inflation in economies with a track record of monetary 
mismanagement (Savastano, 1996). Credibility must be re-established and measures to 
create an environment of de-dollarisation can be taken in parrallel with stabilisation 
policies, with both taking account of risks, capital flights, disintermediation, banking 
sector instability, exchange rate variability, public debt management and prudential 
monetary policy (Chavez, 2010). The mechanism suggested in this paper implies that the 
culture of the Zimbabwe’s economy relies on perceptions of tangibility.Arguably,  using 
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gold as the reserve creates a tangibility perception which will go a long way to restoring 
confidence in agents that use the local currency against which it is issued. It would be 
easy to convert gold into dollar reserves, but the view is that this is more fluid and less 
tangible and more susceptible to manipulation. The World Gold Council  (2010) suggests 
that gold reserves can be used as a tactical overlay to hedge against current global 
macroeconomic risks; and as a high-quality liquid asset in periods of distress, the time 
when central banks most need their reserves. It is for these reasons that we select gold as 
our reserve, also because it is in relatively high supply in Zimbabwe with a number of 
established producers.  
 
The market-based mechanism of de-dollarization also relies on dis-incentivising usage of 
the US dollar. When exchange rates can move towards depreciation and appreciation, it 
introduces a disincentive to dollarization in the presence of controlled inflation, even 
more when targeting inflation is in place (Chang, 2010). Bear in mind that this can 
operate in reverse if agents begin to form expectations based on trend, thus to offset this, 
the demand environment should be based on greater liquidity in the local currency than in 
the foreign currency. The issuing of bills and bonds in the domestic currency can put in 
place a benchmark for interest rates; further the development of a foreign exchange 
market and an adequate level of official reserves diminish the need to hold foreign 
currency (Chang, 2010).  Further low and stable inflation is not enough to reverse 
dollarization; credible inflation targeting seems to be important for achieving de-
dollarization. In light of this we must expect that some assets will still remain 
denominated in foreign currency. In the case of Uruguay, there was a negative correlation 
between national income and real exchange rate, meaning that the yield of dollar 
denominated assets rise when national income falls. This would likely mean that in the 
case of Zimbabwe some level of dollarized deposits will always remain (Licandro and 
Masoller 2000).  
 




Market based price risk management refers to any strategy that uses financial products to 
help producers reduce the uncertainty surrounding the prices they can get for their 
product (UNDP, 2011). In terms of market based solutions, for Zimbabwe we have the 
ability to create a reserve based on a legislated free carry on gold which amounts to a 7% 
royalty of all production. However the value of gold is determined in public markets and 
thus to ensure economic stability, the value of these gold reserves must be managed 
through public markets. While this adds another level of risk, it ensures that policy 
formation is conducted in a stable, manageable, and predictable environment. This paper 
endorses the use of barrier or collared option linked in part or in full to the gold reserve. 
Gold producing companies often hedge future production through derivative instruments 
especially in times when the gold price is highly volatile. It must be said, however that 
the long term trend of gold is positive. The method used tries to defend the value of the 
new ZWD. Essentially it’s a call and put option in one instrument, where if the price of 
gold falls the value of the reserve is protected through the ‘put’ leg and if the price rises, 
knock out level are established which ensure that the incremental value does not over 
appreciate the value of the local currency, essentially triggering another barrier option to 
come into place or the sale of gold within the public market.  
 
There are three basic reasons to use barrier options rather than standard options;  
• Barrier option payoffs may more closely match beliefs about the future behaviour 
of the market. 
• Barrier options may match hedging needs more closely than similar standard 
options.  
• Barrier option premium are generally lower than those of standard options. 
(Derman and Kani, 1996)  
The mathematics of the barrier option is beyond the scope of this paper; however 
principally the use of the barrier option is designed to provide stability in monetary policy 
formation, it enables the reincarnation of the trust factor, it supports the idea of protecting 
value, and lastly prevents irregular behaviour by the central bank due to regulated 
exposure to public markets.  
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4.4. De-dollarization, Inflation and Money Supply 
 
By issuing a new currency into an environment where a foreign denominated currency is 
already in circulation presents a serious inflation risk, especially if the productive 
capacity is not present to soak up the new dollars on issue. Zimbabwe presently has 
capacity utilisation of 50%. Many businesses of all scales fail to get the necessary 
funding due to liquidity constraints, driven in part by potential moral hazards prevalent in 
an unproductive economy.  Two considerations need to be made; firstly, the new ZWD is 
asset backed, thus its value is dependent on an underlying instrument, with its exchange 
rate being fixed. Secondly, there is a gap recognised through the underfunded 
manufacturing sector indicative of low capacity utilisation.  
 
Arguably an increase in money supply should look to fill that gap due to high money 
demand, resulting in limited inflationary pressure in the short to medium term (Pettinger, 
2010). As the productive sector recovers, greater competition ensues and this should 
further add downward pressure on inflation. However, as noted earlier, the relationship 
between dollarization and inflation is not clear. Historic examples of countries that have 
seen prolonged periods of low inflation remain dollarized to a high degree (Reinhart et 
al., 2003). That being said, the environment often described is dualised whereas 
Zimbabwe is not, adding to the uniqueness of the situation, and allowing for the 
reinforcement of the production funding gap that presently exists.  Further by creating a 
currency substitution environment one can expect greater exchange rate volatility 
(Alvarez-Plata and Herrero, 2007).  There is a strong positive correlation between 
currency substitution and exchange rate volatility (Calvo and Varlos, 1992). This also 
makes the exchange rate more susceptible to perceptions of increased money supply, 
which on the one hand supports the idea of a managed rate through a gold peg which may 
control potential volatility. On the other hand, could also create arbitrage opportunity 
which could offset necessary gains. In another example, Russia in 2003, experienced 
rapid money growth, while inflation remained low; this missing inflation could be 
explained by de-dollarization. Empirically it has been found that excess supply of broad 
money is inflationary, and has the strongest most significant impact on short-run inflation 




4.5. Multiplier Effect on New Money 
 
Aside from improving liquidity conditions and supplying another from capital, 
reintroducing the ZWD is meant to trigger the deposit multiplier allowing for local 
currency assets to be longer dated thus giving incentive for long term borrowing. The 
bank lending leads to new deposits in the banking system and a multiplier effect on the 
money supply (Manish, 2011). The size of the money multiplier is reduced when funds 
are held as cash and not as deposits. The RBZ has to date increased the reserve ratio 
requirement by banks from U$25,000,000 to U$100,000,000 in order to raise the effect of 
the deposit multiplier, but in a dollarized environment where rate discovery is difficult 
this is unlikely to improve conditions. A shift has occurred where time deposits have 
become more popular due to better savings rates offered; the deposit base continues to be 
dominated by transitory deposits, which cannot support industry as it requires long term 
financing to recapitalise operations (RBZ, 2012). Subsequently the short term nature of 
lending, high liquidity risk and limited access to external lines of credit has deprived the 
economy of capital intensive projects which are imperative for sustainable economic 
growth (RBZ, 2012).  
 
 Complementing the introduction of the ZWD would be reactivation of the money market 
which is the primary environment (ex-repurchase rate) for interest discovery and has 
implications further down the yield curve. Within the de-dollarizing framework it may be 
an option to also bailout local banks through injections of capital. Local banks, as is 
normally the case, would be forced to borrow from the RBZ at a set repo-rate and on-lend 
to the market creating a spread, which would all be done in ZWD. This would in essence 
trigger the deposit multiplier effect.  
 
4.6. Gold Standard 
 
The price of gold had been the single most reliable monetary reference point in human 
history (David Gitlitz 1995). Judy Shelton in her recent book on “Restoring Order to the 
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Global Currency System” argued very strongly for the “re-imposition of an International 
Gold Standard" She thinks that a return to gold backed currencies would force 
governments, to display more fiscal responsibility or face the prospects of investors 
demanding gold for their paper currency”. In the long run the gold commitment by 
government, assures people that the financial assets they are holding can be transferred 
intact between generations (Ninhause, 2011). In the Zimbabwean context, discipline is 
indeed required, but the selection of gold is more the basis of the uniqueness on the 
Zimbabwean condition; which are perceptions of value that reinstate institutional trust, 
and large local reserves of gold which are accessed by a relatively well developed private 
sector. By implication the costs of collecting the royalty are low and borne upon the 
miner rather than the state.  
 
Another angle of observation is to state that the gold reserve is not intended to be a long 
term solution but rather one which sees human productivity improve to a point where the 
economy is healthy enough to respond and react to external stimuli relatively 
independently. The gold standard works in so far as gains in human productivity move at 
roughly the same pace as gains in the production of gold, when human productivity 
outpaces gold an absolute gold standard will create massive deflation (Bowyer, 2007).  
This is to say that gold through time has been a predictor of inflation, however in present 
economic times of booms and busts the human condition is fallible; when Nixon removed 
the gold standard the global economy experienced a period of massive deflation. For 
Zimbabwe presently the production of gold far outpaces GDP growth, and if we 
subscribe to Bowyer’s ideology then there is room for the implementation of an asset –
backed refloats of the ZWD using gold as the base. Under this same premise, however a 
future plan will be required, which will likely be a free-floating of the domestic currency 
subject to political and macroeconomic stability and contingent on growth reaching a 






4.7. Financial Deepening of Local Currency Assets 
 
A two pronged policy approach is needed; development of markets in the domestic 
currency to generate a credible alternative to the dollar and strengthening of the safety net 
through the regulatory recognition of non-marketable risks (Licandro and Licandro, 
2003). It is important to develop financial markets through regulation which will foster an 
environment where the new ZWD can act according to intended market requirements. It 
would be impossible to reintroduce the ZWD if certain changes are not enforced which 
improve financial sector performance and efficiency. In terms of liquidity a differential 
should be created between US Dollar and Zimbabwe dollar deposit. On the solvency, 
capital requirements and provisions should be higher for dollar denominated credit to 
non-tradable sectors than in the credit with no currency mismatch. Also, a deposit 
insurance scheme should be created which takes into account the risk of currency 
mismatches into premiums charged to banks (Licandro and Licandro, 2003). Moreover 
the deepening of domestic financial markets in local currency assets must see the 
evolution of longer maturity assets (Galindo and Leiderman, 2005). Undeniably 
Zimbabwe requires a more secure financial system, one able to respond to shocks, and 
where risk can be better priced due to improved flow of information and transparency. 
The concerns around property rights are also well warranted and without some kind of 
indication or event that shows that these rights are respected the financial sector will 
continue to see challenges.  
 
4.8. Why the Zimbabwe Dollar 
 
Earlier in the paper we indicated the currency options the government is considering, 
which include; adopting the US dollar in full, waiting for a regional currency, joining the 
South African Currency Union which in essence means fully adopting the Rand, and 
lastly re-introducing the ZWD. The paper has already explained the weakenesses 
currently prevelant in using the US dollar. Arguably the economy will remain stagnant if 
it has to wait for a regional currency which is yet to be formulated. In addition, lack of 
integration between regional economies may render the effectiveness of a common Sub-
Saharan monetary unit ineffective and actually could establish an environment of defacto 
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dollarisation. Empirically joining the South Africa Currency Union presents a prudent 
solution to improving the financial environment. After running a simple least squares 
regression on the Zimbabwean CPI and the South African price index using 37 data 
points between 2009 and 2012 we find a positive and significant relationship, where  
98% of the variation in Zimbabwean CPI can be explained by changes in the South 
African CPI (Appendix 1). A logical conclusion for this relationship is that Zimbabwe is 
heavily reliant on South Africa for its imports, thus changes in prices of goods and 
services, be they finished or raw materials, will have an impact on prices within the 
Zimbabwean economy. Interestingly a similar study using US consumer prices shows no 
such similarites, implying that the economic links between Zimbabwe and the US are 
limited. Notwithstanding this, arguments provide that volatility of the rand, political 
uncertainty in South Africa, and some level of national soveriengty are deterrents to 
adopting the rand. The US dollar on the other hand is the currency in which most of 
Zimbabwe’s export commodities are denominated, further the currency is more trusted as 
a store of value due to its perceived stability but as we have shown it has its challenges 













5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This paper makes use of robust research methodology that takes a quantitative approach. 
Our research includes the design of a theoretical model which is supported by strong and 
in-depth data sets and analysis. These various different data sets are used to analyse the 
present state of the Zimbabwe’s financial economy between periods pre and post 
dollarization. This allows us to identify to whom Zimbabwe’s economy has the strongest 
linkages. By understanding these linkages we can see effectiveness of dollarization on the 
Zimbabwean economy in relation to the price environment. Money supply and liquidity 
are also important variables along with the respective demand and supply of money 
(capital) by financial institutions, as this is what will determine the growth or lack thereof 
in manufacturing production. In essence we should see that due to a low liquidity 
(turnover of money) production cannot grow and economic improvements cannot occur. 
Each data set will be described and results explained. Ultimately each test should reflect 
the strengths and weaknesses of dollarization, and extrapolation of these data points 
should lead to suggestion of an alternative. Our methodology will show that one can 
smooth out the volatility in Money Supply, which should improve predictive assessments 




6. RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1.1. Financial Dollarization and Economic Volatility  
Past research suggests that dollarization post a hyperinflationary period reduces economic 
and price volatility while restoring confidence and predictability. In this analysis we look 
at the rolling changes in Standard Deviation of Zimbabwe’s GDP from 1980 to 2012 and 
CPI changes between 2009 and 2012. We already know inflation prior this period was at 
astronomical levels. The period of dollarization is between 2009 and 2012 volatility 
reaches its lowest record level since independence for GDP; low values are seen for CPI 
as well.  
Data set:   Zimbabwe GDP 1980 -2012 
  Changes in Zimbabwe CPI pre and post dollarization  
  36 Data points  








































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14 Data Source World Bank Zimbabwe GDP in Current USD, World Bank 
 
As indicated above, during the period of dollarization, volatility is seen to have 
decreased. Taking this further we test the relationship between increases in USD deposits 
(M3) against GDP changes to see if USD environment explains the falls in economic 
volatility – due the limited number of data points our results do not provide any 
conclusive indication of a relationship. While our R-Square is strong at 0.605, the levels 
of significance do not support our assumption that increases in USD deposits should have 




     
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.778305 
     R Square 0.605758 
     Adjusted R Square 0.408637 
     Standard Error 1.627172 
     Observations 4 
     
       ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 8.136412 8.136412 3.073026 0.221695 
 Residual 2 5.295374 2.647687 



































































































































































































































































































































Zimbabwe GDP Annual (St.deviaton - 3Yr Rolling)
GDP - CHG - 3Yr Rolling
Period of Dollarization 
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Total 3 13.43179       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 7.453456 1.01217 7.363841 0.017946 3.098442 11.80847 
M3 Money Supply 0.163733 0.093401 1.753005 0.221695 -0.23814 0.565605 
 
(Please note: Zimbabwe instituted a multicurrency regime, involving the use of other currencies not just dollars, it is  just dollars that 
are better represented in the deposits of financial institutions are recorded by the Reserve Bank) 
 
A closer look at CPI changes in the dollarized environment indicates that volatility over 4 
years analyzed quarterly has decreased.  
 
 
Source Data. Source. RBZ, Interims Monetary Policy Statement Updates 2009 – 2011,2012 
 
To conclude – observational analysis of standard deviation indicates that during periods 
of dollarization economic and price volatility is low.  
6.1.2. Zimbabwe Consumer Price Inflation and currency, regional and 
international relationship  
We analyze this information to reflect that Zimbabwe has limited economic ties with the 
United States and greater ties with South Africa and Europe in a dollarized context (2009 
-2012). Changes in the rand/dollar exchange rate go a long way in explaining price 
movements in Zimbabwe (as measured by CPI) at least this is what we would expect, 
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CPI measures used are that of China, United Kingdom, USA, South Africa, and the Euro 
Area.  
Data Set:  Zimbabwe CPI (dependent variable) with SA, UK, USA, China annual CPI as independent variables.  
Zimbabwe CPI (dependent Variable) with Rand, Pound, Yuan as independent variables. 
Data Observations 45 (2010-2013) 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
       
         Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.6212862 
       R Square 0.3859966 
       Adjusted R Square 0.3260938 
       Standard Error 1.4772234 
       Observations 46 
       
         ANOVA 
          df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 4 56.2456382 14.06141 6.4437179 0.000405062 
   Residual 41 89.46974441 2.1821889 
     Total 45 145.7153826     
   
           Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 1.7075351 2.158831217 0.7909535 0.4335229 -2.652312992 6.0673831 -2.652313 6.0673831 
SA CPI YoY -0.1292436 0.583868287 -0.2213575 0.8259129 -1.308389539 1.0499023 -1.3083895 1.0499023 
USD CPI YoY -1.0846154 1.242232136 -0.8731181 0.3876839 -3.593354039 1.4241233 -3.593354 1.4241233 
Euro CPI YoY 2.1465139 0.644161729 3.3322593 0.001833 0.845602943 3.4474249 0.8456029 3.4474249 
China CPI YoY -0.2074004 0.207828345 -0.9979408 0.3241616 -0.627118235 0.2123175 -0.6271182 0.2123175 
 
While the regression is valid the results show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between Euro-Area CPI and Zimbabwe CPI YoY. Thirty eight percent of the 
changes in Zimbabwe CPI are explained by the independent variables. With South Africa 
being Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner we would have expected a stronger relationship 
however this may not be reflected in our test due to the timing of the observations.  
 
We already know South Africa is Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, therefore we re-run 
the regression lagging the SA CPI by 1 month and the result affirms our assumption that 
prices changes in Zimbabwe are significantly explained by price changes in South Africa, 




SACPI vs. ZIMCPI YoY lagged 1 
Period 
       
         Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.983064 
       R Square 0.966416 
       Adjusted R Square 0.965483 
       Standard Error 0.623513 
       Observations 38 
       
         ANOVA 
          df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 1 402.7351 402.7351 1035.927 3.97E-28 
   Residual 36 13.99565 0.388768 
     Total 37 416.7307       
   
           Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 19.60399 2.364752 8.290083 7.23E-10 14.80805 24.39993 14.80805 24.39993 
SACPI YOY 0.669894 0.020813 32.18581 3.97E-28 0.627683 0.712106 0.627683 0.712106 
 
The effect of currencies relationships is important and we look to explain the effect of 
currency on Zimbabwe CPI.4  
 
It is important to also look at currency relationship to consumer inflation as means of 
deepened the analysis of the regional and international economic relationships during 
dollarization.  
Regional and International Currency against Zimbabwe CPI YoY  
GDP,CNY,EUR,ZAR vs. ZIMCPI 
YoY 
       
         Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.6900393 
       R Square 0.4761542 
       Adjusted R Square 0.4250473 
       Standard Error 1.3644653 
       Observations 46 
       
         ANOVA 
          df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 4 69.38299859 17.34575 9.316829 1.89E-05 
   Residual 41 76.33238402 1.861765 
     
                                                        
4 Please, note the European Union is the Zimbabwe’s second largest trading partner after South Africa 
which could partly explain this relationship 
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Total 45 145.7153826       
   
           Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 63.791699 22.9105353 2.784383 0.008078 17.52293 110.0605 17.5229346 110.0605 
Pound 6.8663734 7.328688197 0.936917 0.354288 -7.93421 21.66696 -7.9342125 21.66696 
Yuan -4.361638 1.854442734 -2.35199 0.023557 -8.10676 -0.61651 -8.1067606 -0.61651 
Euro -22.80003 4.689056481 -4.86239 1.74E-05 -32.2698 -13.3303 -32.269768 -13.3303 
Rand  -1.634317 0.392915607 -4.15946 0.000159 -2.42783 -0.84081 -2.4278262 -0.84081 
 
When testing for currency the results are as expected. A greater amount of Zimbabwe’s 
CPI is explained the Yuan, Euro, and Rand with significance as opposed to the previous 
test which used CPI YoY data. Interestingly, the Euro has the largest coefficient, versus 
China, and lastly the Rand. This is an unexpected result. We run the regression again with 
just the rand and again we lag for 1month we see the results improve dramatically.  
 
ZAR vs. ZIMCPI Yoy, Lagged 1 
Period 
       
         Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.523295 
       R Square 0.273837 
       Adjusted R Square 0.25309 
       Standard Error 0.04056 
       Observations 37 
       
         ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 1 0.021713 0.021713 13.19855 0.000889 
   Residual 35 0.057578 0.001645 
     Total 36 0.079291       
   
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept -0.01807 0.007663 -2.35802 0.02409 -0.03363 -0.00251 -0.03363 -0.00251 
X Variable 1 4.942856 1.360551 3.632981 0.000889 2.180791 7.704921 2.180791 7.704921 
 
To conclude, CPI and regional and international currency can be used to explain the 
relatively decent amounts of movement in Zimbabwe’s consumer prices in a dollarized 
environment. The South African rand and prices in a dollarized setting have strong 
relationships with Zimbabwean prices; one would therefore expect that if there were an 
economic shock in South Africa it would certainly be felt in Zimbabwe. As some of the 
literature reviewed has explained, dollarization may sometimes have the effect of leaving 
an economy exposed to economic shocks (Cabral-Torres, 2005). With strong linkages to 
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South Africa, possibly adopting the South Africa Currency Union (SACU) could likely 
have a positive impact on the state of the Zimbabwean economy. We take closer look at 
money supply.  
 
6.1.3. Money Supply (M3), Supply of Credit and Growth 
Our previous tests confirmed that dollarization reduces economic and price volatility. We 
have also shown the Zimbabwe’s prices can be explained to a large extent by movement 
in the South African prices, as well as changes in the South African Rand. We now look 
at the relationship between money supply, the provision of credit to the private sector, the 
depth of lending in financial institutions, and GDP growth. We have argued that the 
extension credit should contribute towards economic growth. We further suggest that in 
illiquid markets or tight markets credit risk is high and usually there is a mismatch in 
lending and deposit rates which creates inefficiencies that may stifle growth. We would 
expect that as Money Supply (M3) grows, loans and credit should grow, and this should 
have a positive and significant relationship to GDP. Failure to witness this result in any of 
these variables would likely suggest that credit markets are tight, and hence the above 
mismatch exists. Therefore we ran a test during the period of dollarization (2009 – 2012) 
to see the relationship between GDP, M3, LDR, & PSC using the equation below;  
 
32130 xxx PSCLDRMGDP +++=   
32130 xxx PSCLDRMGDP +++= 
 
        
         
Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.922970916 
       R Square 0.851875313 
       Adjusted R Square 0.838805487 
       Standard Error 0.715481556 
       Observations 38 
       
         ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 3 100.0977668 33.36592225 65.17878 3.50763E-14 
   Residual 34 17.40507114 0.511913857 
     Total 37 117.5028379       
   
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 2.950883349 0.604352867 4.882715892 2.44E-05 1.72269056 4.179076 1.722691 4.179076 
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M3 1.77831E-09 4.13427E-10 4.301392724 0.000135 9.38126E-10 2.62E-09 9.38E-10 2.62E-09 
LDR 0.629251912 1.974018471 0.318766983 0.751853 -3.382436265 4.64094 -3.38244 4.64094 
PSC  -0.84514118 1.357025076 -0.622789656 0.537578 -3.602947923 1.912666 -3.60295 1.912666 
 
While the test is valid, only Money Supply (M3) has a positive and significant effect on 
GDP growth over the period. Loans to Deposits and Private Sector credit produce 
insignificant coefficients. This would support the view of weak or tight credit markets, 
possibly suggesting that the levelling off of GDP growth in Zimbabwe is mainly due to 
inefficiencies in credit markets. These inefficiencies may result from a mismatch of rates, 
lack of financial deepening, a non-existent multiplier effect, and a very short yield curve 
to determine a market efficient level of interest rates.  
 
In conclusion, the growth that has been seen in GDP since the introduction of 
dollarization as a policy measure was a function of a recovery from a low economic base; 
it would take an effective credit market to drive further economic improvement (inter 
alia). Credit risk would be addressed through restructured financial regulatory institutions 
and the establishment of range of financial instruments that allow the derivation of a 
prime interest rate. Banks do not have money to lend without fear of losing liquidity and 
money is too difficult to obtain to repay loans, which is putting off prospective borrowers 
(Pytel, 2010). Thus according to our tests, not only does money supply have to improve, 
the more crucial and necessary solution is an effective financial system. Add to that, 
while volatility, predictability, and some level of economic confidence have been 
restored under the dollarized regime, the policy measure may not have a strong enough 
relationship to growth to actually drive it. 
 
6.1.4. Money Supply (M3), and Inflation  
 
Volatility of Money Supply 
Common reference is made to the relationship between money supply and inflation. 
Firstly we analyse changes in M3 YoY in Zimbabwe since 2010 charted against South 
Africa and Euro-Area M3. The chart suggests the changes in ZIMM3YOY are far more 





Figure 15 Source. Bloomberg Data – Changes in M3 YoY 
 
We do this observational analysis to merely reflect how large the swings are in 




Figure 16 Source Bloomberg Data – Rolling 3Month Volatility  
 
We illustrated earlier that ‘deposit days’ are very short, therefore implementing effective 
monetary policy would require more stable M3, or a policy measure that could otherwise 

























In conclusion, again this volatility supports our argument that lack and rate discovery, 
and weaknesses of financial economic confidence inter alia may have a limiting effect on 
the economy. The above chart will be used again later in the paper as it will be the basis 
for our argument for bringing back the Zimbabwe Dollar using a gold float. The 
theoretical model will show that in a dualised currency environment (ZWD plus USD) 
the addition on new dollars should smooth out ZIMM3YOY volatility and allow for 
better policy creation which will be effective in resuscitating Zimbabwe’s financial 
economy. 
 
Money Supply and Inflation 
ZIMM3YOY % explained very little of the movement in ZIMCPIYOY %, which is the 
opposite result of what we would reasonably expect. A regression examining the changes 
in inflation versus money supply produces insignificant results. We will test later if an 
injection of new money to existing money in circulation will produce a significant result 





In conclusion, according to the test conducted, in Zimbabwe the money supply and 














targets inflation in an effort to manage growth outcomes of a country. To do this it is 
important to understand the circulation of currency in an economy using M3 – inflation is 
technically due to increases in money supply. Monetary policy should in effect be used to 
smooth out the heightened effects of the business cycle (Roubini, 2011). We could 
conclude from our analysis that in Zimbabwe this is not occurring.  
 
6.1.5. Barrier Options – Straddles or Combinations and how they protect 
value and create income – on a commodity  
 
Options Explained in Context 
The process of backing the ZWD with gold looks to protect the value of the gold reserves 
and therefore the value of the currency by writing (selling) and purchasing derivative 
strategies designed to cover any unexpected volatility beyond a particular level. We use 
8% in this model as an acceptable risk daily limit. Options are used which give the holder 
the right but not the obligation to buy or sell the underlying commodity at particular level 
in the future. Ideally, one would write an option of a future traded on a commodity 
exchange. 
Option Pay off Profile 
 




The profiles we are particularly focussed on are the long put and short call. The long put 
entails paying a premium which means an outflow from our base. While the short call 
means we earn an income as we receive income from the purchaser. As the value of our 
base needs to remain within our set limits in the face of a fluctuating gold price, the 
following  must occur. If the gold price rises above our upper limit (+8%) put options are 
bought. The outlay will bring the implied value our underlying back into a range set by 
the central bank, and protects the gold asset from any downside. If the price of gold falls, 
call options are sold which means the central bank receives income that brings the 
implied value of the asset back into the pre-established range. This means that the value 
of our physical position in gold, and therefore the currency, remains within set and 
acceptable risk levels as determined by the central bank, in this model it is an 8% range.  
 
Mechanism  
We describe and test the workings of the barrier option and the pay-off profile in the 
event of gold price volatility beyond the strike price on both the up and down legs. The 
strategy is designed around calculations of rolling 3 month Standard Deviation. These are 
the acceptable risk limits beyond which active action is taken to protect the value of the 
underlying asset. The strategy is traded in the open market for gold derivatives and 
structured in a way that prevents arbritage on the ZWD, as the underlying value is kept 
approximately but not exactly the same.  
 
It is important to take some aspects of the profile into acount:  
 
a. Central Bank manages the derivative strategy. 
b. For the purpose of this example, the risk limit is set at 8% on the up and downside 
of the basket. Therefore, if the gold price (of gold in the vault) is $1039, the upper 
limit is $1122 and the lower limit is $957. 
c. The purchasing of options implies an outlay of cash which is paid to the contract 




d. The writing of options implies that receipt of income from the purchaser of the 
option (in cash USD). 
e. If the gold price breaks through the 8%  on the upside, put options are purchased 
(outflow). Call options are written (sold) in the event that the gold price moves 
below 8% i.e below $957. 
f. The  strike price is set as the aggregate average price of all gold received and in 
vault eg;  
Month Gold in Vault (Kgs) Gold Price at Receipt (USD) Total Value (Px and 
Quantity 
March  8.595 919.35 278729 
April 10.845 888.2 339778 
May  12.105 979.18 418102 









MONTH 1 & 3
New Gold 
recieved in Vault 
and Value set



















Back-testing of Option Strategy  
 
Figure 17 Source Bloomberg Data – Refer to Appendix for full data set 
 
 
Using the 8% band, the strategy is back tested in the graph above. Effectively if the gold price 
breaks the 8% band on the upside – the difference between the underlying value of the gold stock 
and the implied (market value) is accounted for by the purchase of an equivalent amount of put 
options. This is illustrated in the table below (full table Appendix A). In the period calculated 
there, are no down days on the gold price, therefore no call options are written to earn an income 














Average Px of 





Value of Gold in 
Vault
Implied Value (M kt 
Value) Surplus or Deficit  






Effect on Implied 
Value Stratregy 
1/1/2010 1097.35 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472$          12,014,885.15$      640,412.98$         5% -            -                          -                      0
1/4/2010 1121.28 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,276,894.72$    902,422.55$         7% -            -                          -                      0
1/5/2010 1118.05 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,241,529.45$     867,057.28$         7% -            -                          -                      0
1/6/2010 1138.25 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,462,699.25$   1,088,227.08$      9% 11               1,088,227              11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/7/2010 1131.75 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,391,530.75$     1,017,058.58$        8% 10              1,017,059                11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/8/2010 1138.23 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,462,480.27$   1,088,008.10$      9% 11               1,088,008              11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/11/2010 1151.85 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,611,605.65$      1,237,133.48$       10% 12              1,237,133               11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/12/2010 1128.48 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,355,727.52$     981,255.35$          8% -            -                          -                      0
1/13/2010 1138.18 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,461,932.82$    1,087,460.65$      9% 11               1,087,461               11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/14/2010 1142.75 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,511,969.75$      1,137,497.58$        9% 11               1,137,498               11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/15/2010 1130.93 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,382,552.57$     1,008,080.40$     8% 10              1,008,080              11,374,472.17     Long Put
1/18/2010 1134.1 1039 1122 956 10949 11,374,472.17$      12,417,260.90$    1,042,788.73$      8% 10              1,042,789              11,374,472.17     Long Put




Table 2 Source Bloomberg Data – With Calculations for option contracts 
 
The options on the long put leg would provide better pay-off  if they expire and the gold 
price is back within the range. If the put expires and is in the money, the value of the 
underlying would rise, effectively increasing the value of the gold stock and therefore 
strength in the currency.  
The short call option (written option) would provide a bearish strategy that provides 
income, and again expiry when gold price is within the range would be an ideal outcome. 
Because we already sit on physical gold which can be delivered if the option is excerised 
by the holder – another strategy would be needed that knocks the option out in the event 
of adverse moves. A short call is one of the riskiest option strategies in the event that the 
price of the underlying continues to rise.  
 
Figure 18 Source Bloomberg Data – Refer to Appendix for full data set 
 
These contract maybe over gold futures – therefore the character of their structure is 
standardised. 1 Contract entitles the holder to 100troy oz; each point value move is $100 
– therefore contract value for 1 Contract is $100,000 
The model shows that the real value of gold in the vault can be protected from swings in 




















































































































































































Value of Gold in Vault




6.2. MODEL: THEORETICAL MODEL OF DE-DOLLARISATION 
 
In this section we present a theoretical model which creates a dualised currency 
environment. We show what this model would look like if implemented at the 
commencement of formal dollarization (2009) and how this significant increase in money 
supply should improve the relationship with inflation, which we have already shown to 
be weak. Additionally, implementation of the model would also smooth out the volatility 
in money supply – both of which will be positive for the Zimbabwean economy. Inflation 
of course, will require other measures to prevent it from getting out of control; however 
in the short term we would expect productive capacity to soak up the excess dollars in 
circulation. 
 
6.2.1. An asset backed refloat in this context means using an asset that has 
visible value  as determined by some commonly used measure, benchmark, or market 
based price discvoery mechanism. In this case we have selected gold for reasons already 
addressed in this paper. Gold will be collected in physical form and held in vault by the 
Reserve Bank and stamped as bullion.5 
6.2.2. Based on the amount of gold collected on a month to month basis, the 
RBZ would issue new ZWD notes in quantity determined by an exchange rate estimated 
by the RBZ. The notes will be a representation of the gold held by the RBZ. In our model 
we have assumed an exchange rate of 0.01 to the USD, pegged to the value of gold and 
based on the number of notes initially printed to represent the gold collected in vault. 
New notes would be injected into the economy via the operations of the central bank. 
Because of demand and supply dynamics which are already in play, there will exist a 
notional value for the Zimbabwe dollar, this would be difficult to calculate and for now is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
6.2.3. Simultaneously, a barrier option would be written which protects the gold 
reserve’s value from downside risk through the ‘put option’ leg, and appreciation risk 
which could erode export competitiveness (appreciation of the ZWD) through the sale of 
a ‘call option’. Essentially the gold reserves value would be predetermined within a band 
                                                        
5 London Bullion Market Association provides the standard for gold quality be issuing a stamp which 
standardises gold content level.  
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set by the barrier option, described earlier, technically and losely indexed to the spot price 
of gold. By subscribing to a derivative instrument, the RBZ would not be able to issue 
more currency than what is required under the semi-pegged exchange rate regime. This 
would be until such time that more reserves are collected, which would reset the barrier 
option levels. Any conversion of gold reserves on the upside would sit in the RBZ as 
foreign currency reserve whose value would be stated as ‘Assets’ on the central bank’s 
balance sheet.  
6.2.4. The second step requires a form of local bank bailout, where the RBZ 
injects capital intended for specifically long term lending creating a ZWD based liability 
environment. This, in part, would be facilitated by direct injections with the expectation 
that foreign banks will loosen their lending requirements in order to maintain competitive 
pace with local banks The money market would also need to be denominated in local 
currency. As this paper has explained, the long term rate discovery is dependent on the 
short term money market environment. In short, a ZWD based yeild curve needs to be 
created. The repurchase rate will also be designated for ZWD liabilities.  
6.2.5. Monetary Policy Transmission mechanism  
 a. Gold Royalties are collected by the reserve bank in bullion format  
 b. Notes printed in ZWD format which are backed as claim on that gold  
 d. Exchange rate is set at 0.01 to the USD 
 c. Notes are injected into the economy via central bank transmission  
 
The process effectively increases the amount of overall dollars in the economy, which 
should smooth out M3 volatility – allowing for the improved effeciency in other 




Figure 19 Data Source. RBZ and  Ministry of Finance Gold Royalty Figures 
 
The chart above is a representation of the percentage make-up of US Dollars, Gold 
Reserves and ZWD if gold reserves are used to back the printing of new ZWD using an 
exchange rate of 0.01. By 2010, half of the notes in circulation would be ZWD, by 2013 
over 80% of money in circulation would be ZWD. 
 
6.2.6. Money Supply (M3) Smoothing 
It not enough to just reintroduce ZWD, we have to understand its effect on M3 volatility. 
In our model we back test the effect of now increased M3 by adding our new ZWD to 
USD which is already in circulation. We use our observations to see if this new money 
































































































































Figure 20 Data Source. RBZ and  Ministry of Finance Gold Royalty Figures 
 
The blue line is the rolling volatility of the already existing USD in circulation (as shown 
above) as a consequence of dollarisation. The purple line is the addtion of the ZWD to 
the dollarised environment and the effect it has on volatility measured quartely over the 
period. The result is a significant decline in M3 volatility, the smoothing effect as 
anticipated. An outcome that would be very positive for the Zimbabwean economy. This 
would certainly support a case for re-introducing the ZWD.  
 
6.2.7. Counteracting the movement in the gold price 
Movement in the gold price would have a direct effect in the level of M3 due to the gold 
peg. The value of the gold price would be protected by barrier option which ensures that 
the value of the gold reserves in dollars is maintained. This would mean the value in 
ZWD would be maintained. The barrier option involves knock out calls and puts which 
are triggered when the price of gold rises or falls above a certain level. Effectively if the 
price of gold breaches a set level, gold is sold in the market and dollars are maintained in 
reserve. Conversely, if the price of gold falls below a particular level a put option comes 
into effect protecting the value of the physical position. The barrier maintains the value of 
























































































































































































6.2.8. Effect of new M3(USD existing plus ZWD new) on Inflation 
The inflation relationship shows very small changes which can be considered 
insignificant as shown below. This is due to the lack of linkages between prices and 
money supply   
 
Figure 21 Data Source. Data Source. RBZ and  Ministry of Finance Gold Royalty Figures 
 
The model suggests that so long as there is strong economic reliance on South Africa, 
Zimbabwean inflation, even in the face of ZWD introduction and adjsutments to inflation 
through new money, should remain stable and to an extent predictable. In each test the 
dependent variable is ZIMCPIYOY. 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 21.61529 6.571461 3.289266 0.003346 
M3 + Gold -5.8E-10 4.4E-10 -1.32821 0.197724 
ZAR 0.304892 0.124864 2.441785 0.023115 
SACPI 0.64796 0.068431 9.468862 3.23E-09 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 21.76028 40.7966 0.533385 0.599368 
ZWD/ZAR 0.13262 13.65962 0.009709 0.992345 
ZAR 0.341338 2.558311 0.133423 0.895129 
SACPI 0.670692 0.080098 8.373401 3.93E-08 


















This environment would likely prevail for a period until capacity utilisation is restored 
levels which would reflect improved demand vs supply metrics.  
 
6.2.9. The Zimbabwe Dollar: Will it Work  
The data we have examined shows that the refloat can reduce the volatility of money 
supply and inflation in the short-run is not impacted by the new dollars. However the ties 
to South Africa will still account for most of the movement in Zimbabwe price. The 
implementation of the ZWD cannot be done without other economic and instutional 
reforms which aid the creation of interest rate even if fixed for a period of time.  
 
6.2.10. Limitations 
Despite our confidence in soundness of the above theoretical model, based on the robust 
data analysis and testing, it is important to highlight that the main limitation is the use of 
38 data points. This may affect the validity and levels of significance the overall model 






• Economic Expectations 
In this paper we present the notion of a high production demand, which should in essence 
for some time offset the potential increases in inflation due to rising money supply. By 
implementing the new currency we can expect that the production demand money supply 
gap to close. This should also bring the spread between lending rates and deposit rates 
closer. Simply put, one can expect that as production utilisation rises, recorded through 
broad economic increases in capacity, share of short-term deposits to fall reflecting 
higher incomes and less of an inclination toward a cash economy. This should support 
improvements in the deposit money multiplier. Through seeing increases in private 
deposits, banks should be more inclined to lend. A greater supply of deposits should see a 
falling lending rate and in Zimbabwe, this is likely to lead to lower interest rates in 
general. In a market economy the primary benefit of low interest rates is the stimulative 
effect on economic activity, low rates also improve bank balance sheets and banks’ 
capacity to lend (Neely, 2011) . Keeping short term interest rates low improves the 
banking industry’s net interest margin, (i.e. borrow short and lend long with) which 
improves banks retained earnings and thus capital.  
 
Earlier in the paper, we presented the benefits of low rates costs which must not be 
overlooked. In the long run low rates penalise savers. Another significant cost of low 
rates is risks to higher inflation. Arguably offseting the inflation effect is the gold reserve, 
which must be translated into gold value. For instance, if inflation is running high in 
Zimbabwe, yet the gold price is steady or falling then the buying power of the new 
Zimbabwe dollar and the local inflationary increase offset themselves. In taking 
corrective action by adjusting the value of the gold reserve it will inturn adjust the value 
of the Zimbabwe dollar. Monetary instruments such as treasury bills can also be used in 
terms of sterilised and unsterilised effect dependent on which is needed at the time. 
 
The signal for the shift to a new currency regime should occur when capacity utilisation 
is high and inflation variation is at levels deemed not suitable for the economy. At this 
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point the gold peg would need to be reviewed in order to avoid the deflationary effects of 
delinking the currency from this asset base.  
 
Introducing a new currency through asset backing increases the supply of local money. 
Creating policy that promotes lending in the local economy will provide stimulus for  
financial depeening which will improve liquidity and thus interest rate discovery, 
encouraging the a de-dollarsing effect. The establishment of a short-term rates through 
the money market will promote an environment of longer dated securities allowing for 
greater investment in capital projects, further dedollarisation should ensue. As the 
economy transitions away from reliance on neighbour imports as a result of increases in 
local productive capacity, we can expect further decreases in the variation of local prices, 
and a decreasing dependence of necessary goods from neighbour countries. Within this 
transition, dependency should move more toward local currency denominated outcomes 
rather than foreign; local currency denominated deposits should rise as percentage of total 
banking deposits due to a decline of interest rate spreads between lenders and depositors. 
Further confidence should be added to the financial economy by having a lender of last 
resort, whose inclination to mismanage is limited because derivative structures designed 
to protect the value of the reserve asset base prevent unplanned increases or decreases in 
money supply.  
 
• Policy Measures and Politics  
Perhaps the largest deterrent to investing in Zimbabwe is the incalculable nature of its 
political circumstances. No value can be applied to this risk as Zimbabwe has no 
soveriegn rating on any long term assets. It serves as an impedient to predicting 
valuations especially when looking to risk free rates, cost of equity and costs of debt on 
assets. Additionally, it contributes in some part to the illiquid and stagnant nature of the 
Zimbabwean economy. Notwithstanding this, the philosophy of bringing back the ZWD 
looks beyond this. A number of stakeholders are involved in this process participating as 
checks and balances upon themselves. It is thus important to display some objectivity 
when considering this policy measure. The gold industry, administrators of the fiscal and 
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monetary policy, public and private sectors, and the populace at large, along with 




We have described the fundamental reasons of why and how Zimbabwe became a 
dollarised economy. We have also explained the historical context and the rationale used 
in implementing a multicurrency environment. Furthermore,  we have explored the 
strengths of the current financial environment which is low inflation, low transaction 
costs, restored financial predictability and generally, a level of confidence restored to 
financial institutions. In this paper, we have presented the weaknesses of the present 
financial environment, namely; the lack of a lender of last resort, a non-existent money 
market, and the irregular behaviour of lending and deposit rates. These have all resulted 
in an illiquid economy unable to respond to shocks, and responsible for low capacity 
utilisation and production. We have briefly described adverse selection issues which 
disincentivise lenders and discourage savers. This has provided intellectual support for 
the present environment stating that this dollarised environment does not show an 
relationship with other dollarised economies.  
 
We have presented a model for de-dollarization through the reintroduction of the ZWD, 
which is backed and pegged to a gold reserve accumulated from entitlements to domestic 
gold production. The value of this reserve is shown to be protected by a barrier derivative 
structure which covers potential gains and losses on the gold index to which it is applied. 
We empirically show that changes in Zimbabwe’s CPI can be accounted for by changes 
in the ZAR and South African consumer prices. Tests on new money show little impact 
on inflation. We have argued that in the short-run, injection of supply will be soaked up 
by productive capacity – at saturation points its likely we would witness a greater 
inflationary effect. It is at this point where we would expect the central bank to start 
relinquishing the peg. Numerous tests show that other variables may account for 
movements in inflation and GDP – therefore policy initiatives of liquitdity creation by 
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bringing to life short to long term money markets should create wholesale improvements 
in the financial economy. 
 
 This paper has stated that politics cannot be ignored, however a level of objectivity is 
required when addressing the possible political impact of implementing such a plan. 
Many subscribe to the philosophy that a change in politics will result in a change in the 
wholesale standard of living in Zimbabwe. This paper does not endorse this belief but 
rather believes that this can be achieved by implementing key strategies that focus on 
developing the appropriate policy formation, and relevant change that addresses the 
current economic shortcomings. This would create an more efficient monertary 
environment which will ultimately create a foundation for a more stable future. We 
strongly argue that bringing back the ZWD would create such opportunities and have a 
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13 APPENDIX A 
Changes in CPI  
 





5/31/2009 0.56% 0.0089661 
6/30/2009 1.00% 0.0098208 
7/31/2009 0.44% 0.0029376 
8/31/2009 -0.55% 0.0078016 
9/30/2009 0.88% 0.0072837 
10/31/2009 -0.11% 0.0072869 
11/30/2009 0.44% 0.0049382 
12/31/2009 0.76% 0.0043821 
1/31/2010 0.97% 0.0026826 
2/28/2010 1.17% 0.0020654 
3/31/2010 0.11% 0.00566 
4/30/2010 0.21% 0.005876 
5/31/2010 -0.10% 0.0016051 
6/30/2010 -0.11% 0.0018203 
7/31/2010 -0.11% 1.103E-06 
8/31/2010 0.11% 0.0012145 
9/30/2010 0.21% 0.0016064 
10/31/2010 0.42% 0.0016009 
11/30/2010 -0.42% 0.0043595 
12/31/2010 0.84% 0.0064019 
1/31/2011 0.73% 0.0069614 
2/28/2011 0.72% 0.0006569 
3/31/2011 0.10% 0.0035982 
4/30/2011 0.10% 0.0035832 
5/31/2011 0.20% 0.00059 
6/30/2011 0.10% 0.0005912 
7/31/2011 0.33% 0.0011233 
8/31/2011 0.84% 0.0038055 
9/30/2011 0.13% 0.0036847 
10/31/2011 0.50% 0.0035665 
11/30/2011 0.21% 0.0019622 
12/31/2011 0.46% 0.0015819 
1/31/2012 0.49% 0.0015274 
2/29/2012 0.43% 0.0003096 
3/31/2012 0.19% 0.0015862 
 
 
GDP Data  
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PX_LAST Chg in GDP Standard Deviation 
6.679 
  8.011 5.014264 
 8.54 15.14367 
 7.764 -11.00515 13.18450781 
6.352 -5.498584 13.78517159 
5.637 -8.883916 2.777362484 
6.218 9.702238 9.899246974 
6.741 11.8891 11.41450636 
7.815 6.276536 2.82897768 
8.286 16.59236 5.164585286 
8.784 16.63855 5.969222441 
8.641 -61.42657 45.0575923 
6.751 -4.571958 40.366028 
6.564 -36.1016 28.48367957 
6.891 20.07339 28.15771796 
7.111 31.32273 36.12067381 
8.553 4.931345 13.24345234 
8.53 -371.8696 225.5509757 
6.402 -4.008459 215.0118757 
6.858 14.03947 217.7817363 
6.69 -40.82143 27.96021344 
6.777 76.89655 58.90423547 
6.342 -15.57931 61.97643703 
5.728 -10.32899 51.94170786 
5.806 73.4359 49.94635369 
5.755 -113.8431 93.81290945 
5.444 -18.50482 93.64465377 
5.292 -35.81579 50.78932088 
4.416 -6.041096 14.95296197 
6.133 2.571928 20.1425478 
7.433 4.717692 5.694149127 
9.656 3.34368 1.086877566 
10.814 8.338515 2.580266189 
 
 
Zimbabwe CPI  
 
Zimbabwe South Africa  USA  Euro-Area  China 
1/31/2010 -4.8 6.1 1.6 0.9 1.5 
2/28/2010 -0.7 5.7 1.3 0.8 2.7 
3/31/2010 3.5 5.2 1.1 1.6 2.4 
4/30/2010 4.8 4.8 0.9 1.6 2.8 
5/31/2010 6.1 4.6 0.9 1.7 3.1 
6/30/2010 5.3 4.1 0.9 1.5 2.9 
7/31/2010 4.1 3.7 0.9 1.7 3.3 
8/31/2010 3.6 3.5 0.9 1.6 3.5 
9/30/2010 4.2 3.1 0.8 1.9 3.6 
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10/31/2010 3.6 3.4 0.6 1.9 4.4 
11/30/2010 4.2 3.5 0.8 1.9 5.1 
12/31/2010 3.2 3.5 0.8 2.2 4.6 
1/31/2011 3.5 3.7 1 2.3 4.9 
2/28/2011 3.1 3.7 1.1 2.4 4.9 
3/31/2011 2.7 4.1 1.2 2.7 5.4 
4/30/2011 2.7 4.3 1.3 2.8 5.3 
5/31/2011 2.52 4.5 1.5 2.7 5.5 
6/30/2011 2.84 5 1.6 2.7 6.4 
7/31/2011 3.26 5.2 1.8 2.6 6.5 
8/31/2011 3.47 5.4 2 2.5 6.2 
9/30/2011 4.31 5.7 2 3 6.1 
10/31/2011 4.2 6 2.1 3 5.5 
11/30/2011 4.28 6.2 2.2 3 4.2 
12/31/2011 4.93 6.1 2.2 2.7 4.1 
1/31/2012 4.26 6.3 2.3 2.7 4.5 
2/29/2012 4.24 6.1 2.2 2.7 3.2 
3/31/2012 4 6 2.3 2.7 3.6 
4/30/2012 4.06 6.1 2.3 2.6 3.4 
5/31/2012 4.02 5.7 2.3 2.4 3 
6/30/2012 4.02 5.5 2.2 2.4 2.2 
7/31/2012 3.94 4.9 2.1 2.4 1.8 
8/31/2012 3.65 4.9 1.9 2.6 2 
9/30/2012 3.19 5.4 2 2.6 1.9 
10/31/2012 3.35 5.6 2 2.5 1.7 
11/30/2012 2.98 5.6 1.9 2.2 2 
12/31/2012 2.9 5.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 
1/31/2013 -0.33 5.4 1.9 2 2 
2/28/2013 2.98 5.9 2 1.8 3.2 
3/31/2013 2.76 5.9 1.9 1.7 2.1 
4/30/2013 2.49 5.9 1.7 1.2 2.4 
5/31/2013 2.2 5.6 1.7 1.4 2.1 
6/30/2013 1.87 5.5 1.6 1.6 2.7 
7/31/2013 1.25 6.3 1.7 1.6 2.7 
8/31/2013 1.28 6.4 1.8 1.3 2.6 
9/30/2013 0.86 6 1.7 1.1 3.1 










Zimbabwe South Africa  USA  Euro-Area  China 
1/31/2010 -4.8 6.1 1.6 0.9 1.5 
2/28/2010 -0.7 5.7 1.3 0.8 2.7 
3/31/2010 3.5 5.2 1.1 1.6 2.4 
4/30/2010 4.8 4.8 0.9 1.6 2.8 
5/31/2010 6.1 4.6 0.9 1.7 3.1 
6/30/2010 5.3 4.1 0.9 1.5 2.9 
7/31/2010 4.1 3.7 0.9 1.7 3.3 
8/31/2010 3.6 3.5 0.9 1.6 3.5 
9/30/2010 4.2 3.1 0.8 1.9 3.6 
10/31/2010 3.6 3.4 0.6 1.9 4.4 
11/30/2010 4.2 3.5 0.8 1.9 5.1 
12/31/2010 3.2 3.5 0.8 2.2 4.6 
1/31/2011 3.5 3.7 1 2.3 4.9 
2/28/2011 3.1 3.7 1.1 2.4 4.9 
3/31/2011 2.7 4.1 1.2 2.7 5.4 
4/30/2011 2.7 4.3 1.3 2.8 5.3 
5/31/2011 2.52 4.5 1.5 2.7 5.5 
6/30/2011 2.84 5 1.6 2.7 6.4 
7/31/2011 3.26 5.2 1.8 2.6 6.5 
8/31/2011 3.47 5.4 2 2.5 6.2 
9/30/2011 4.31 5.7 2 3 6.1 
10/31/2011 4.2 6 2.1 3 5.5 
11/30/2011 4.28 6.2 2.2 3 4.2 
12/31/2011 4.93 6.1 2.2 2.7 4.1 
1/31/2012 4.26 6.3 2.3 2.7 4.5 
2/29/2012 4.24 6.1 2.2 2.7 3.2 
3/31/2012 4 6 2.3 2.7 3.6 
4/30/2012 4.06 6.1 2.3 2.6 3.4 
5/31/2012 4.02 5.7 2.3 2.4 3 
6/30/2012 4.02 5.5 2.2 2.4 2.2 
7/31/2012 3.94 4.9 2.1 2.4 1.8 
8/31/2012 3.65 4.9 1.9 2.6 2 
9/30/2012 3.19 5.4 2 2.6 1.9 
10/31/2012 3.35 5.6 2 2.5 1.7 
11/30/2012 2.98 5.6 1.9 2.2 2 
12/31/2012 2.9 5.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 
1/31/2013 -0.33 5.4 1.9 2 2 
2/28/2013 2.98 5.9 2 1.8 3.2 
3/31/2013 2.76 5.9 1.9 1.7 2.1 
4/30/2013 2.49 5.9 1.7 1.2 2.4 
5/31/2013 2.2 5.6 1.7 1.4 2.1 
6/30/2013 1.87 5.5 1.6 1.6 2.7 
7/31/2013 1.25 6.3 1.7 1.6 2.7 
8/31/2013 1.28 6.4 1.8 1.3 2.6 
9/30/2013 0.86 6 1.7 1.1 3.1 









ZIMM3YoY SD USD+ZWD SD Inflation Yoy 
SAMYM3Y 
Index SD ECMAM3YY Index SD 
0.030545154 0.023714898 0.012043166 0.00167 0.001527525 
0.029220378 0.014319601 0.005818413 0.005755 0.002516611 
0.023227278 0.004960216 0.00931417 0.012162 0.001154701 
0.029395266 0.005180089 0.008719862 0.00981 0.004618802 
0.056449451 0.005904112 0.003627791 0.006555 0.004358899 
0.112726197 0.006605277 0.003946578 0.010041 0.001527525 
0.109436783 0.00588525 0.003641155 0.010815 0.003 
0.094463326 0.008413779 0.004465146 0.004409 0.001732051 
0.038672977 0.015005435 0.004885482 0.006621 0.001732051 
0.037566973 0.011941404 0.001245662 0.00635 0.002081666 
0.017823717 0.021740516 0.003561679 0.008372 0.002081666 
0.021370342 0.010480103 0.002645435 0.007922 0.001732051 
0.024089137 0.00947053 0.000645812 0.002787 0.002081666 
0.027889236 0.011262483 0.00161328 0.000777 0.001 
0.03127406 0.018183731 0.002672369 0.002854 0.00057735 
0.030556326 0.018194224 0.003360442 0.003176 0.002309401 
0.01178979 0.014826765 0.006115828 0.005952 0.002309401 
0.023363469 0.008134199 0.004193046 0.005208 0.002309401 
0.019376679 0.005426853 0.000489646 0.002631 0.002 
0.030179553 0.002400434 0.004073408 0.005977 0.001527525 
0.045047519 0.020026303 0.003311738 0.008041 0.002645751 
0.075950332 0.023937652 0.003249316 0.012155 0.00450925 
0.075477892 0.022997842 0.002791538 0.004539 0.004041452 
0.046340022 0.011627208 0.001584181 0.003853 0.002081666 
 
 
Model for ZWD Introduction  
Date  
USD Money Supply 
Measured as Deposits 
USD Value of Gold 
Reserves 
Zimbabwe Dollar Notes 
Issued 
3/31/2009               399,800,000                            278,729                   27,872,856  
4/30/2009               490,500,000                            618,506                   61,850,639  
5/31/2009               596,700,000                       1,036,608                103,660,819  
6/30/2009               709,700,000                       1,593,989                159,398,880  
7/31/2009               784,900,000                       2,428,375                242,837,517  
8/31/2009               862,000,000                       3,242,186                324,218,562  
9/30/2009               969,300,000                       4,153,931                415,393,051  
10/31/2009               991,700,000                       5,282,373                528,237,293  
11/30/2009           1,200,000,000                       6,516,325                651,632,545  
12/31/2009           1,400,000,000                       7,562,828                756,282,828  
1/31/2010           1,407,800,000                       8,608,007                860,800,699  
2/28/2010           1,500,000,000                       9,601,438                960,143,810  
3/31/2010           1,610,000,000                    10,947,965            1,094,796,458  
4/30/2010           1,750,000,000                    12,134,502            1,213,450,173  
5/31/2010           1,800,000,000                    13,468,594            1,346,859,434  
6/30/2010           1,900,000,000                    14,981,170            1,498,116,976  
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7/31/2010           1,917,700,000                    16,559,614            1,655,961,389  
8/31/2010           2,040,200,000                    18,347,586            1,834,758,589  
9/30/2010           2,289,500,000                    20,173,343            2,017,334,343  
10/31/2010           2,070,700,000                    22,251,321            2,225,132,062  
11/30/2010           2,137,800,000                    24,517,737            2,451,773,722  
12/31/2010           2,327,600,000                    26,726,587            2,672,658,724  
1/31/2011           2,361,900,000                    28,478,141            2,847,814,088  
2/28/2011           2,458,100,000                    30,261,377            3,026,137,705  
3/31/2011           2,578,200,000                    32,450,636            3,245,063,624  
4/30/2011           2,600,000,000                    34,910,405            3,491,040,519  
5/31/2011           2,733,600,000                    37,465,126            3,746,512,558  
6/30/2011           2,899,700,000                    39,765,443            3,976,544,276  
7/31/2011           2,907,000,000                    42,665,776            4,266,577,586  
8/31/2011           2,952,400,000                    45,925,745            4,592,574,493  
9/30/2011           3,029,300,000                    49,070,283            4,907,028,344  
10/31/2011           3,211,900,000                    52,442,587            5,244,258,713  
11/30/2011           3,300,000,000                    55,913,173            5,591,317,338  
12/31/2011           3,300,000,000                    59,497,627            5,949,762,664  
1/31/2012           3,100,000,000                    64,436,386            6,443,638,605  
2/29/2012           3,380,000,000                    68,969,540            6,896,953,959  
3/31/2012           3,438,600,000                    74,167,670            7,416,767,041  
4/30/2012           3,453,600,000                    79,346,985            7,934,698,534  
 
 
Date Yoy Inflation  Yoy % change in M3 Yoy Chg in ZAR  Yoy Chg in SACPO 
3/31/2010 3.60% 7.33% -23.34% 5.11% 
 4/30/2010 4.85% 8.70% -13.35% 4.80% 
 5/31/2010 6.01% 2.86% -3.38% 4.60% 0.030545154 
6/30/2010 5.31% 5.56% -0.56% 4.21% 0.029220378 
7/31/2010 4.16% 0.93% -5.98% 3.70% 0.023227278 
8/31/2010 3.60% 6.39% -5.18% 3.50% 0.029395266 
9/30/2010 4.28% 12.22% -7.28% 3.21% 0.056449451 
10/31/2010 3.59% -9.56% -10.44% 3.40% 0.112726197 
11/30/2010 4.13% 3.24% -4.07% 3.58% 0.109436783 
12/31/2010 3.25% 8.88% -10.39% 3.48% 0.094463326 
1/31/2011 3.33% 1.47% -5.78% 3.65% 0.038672977 
2/28/2011 3.09% 4.07% -9.68% 3.72% 0.037566973 
3/31/2011 2.63% 4.89% -7.01% 4.14% 0.017823717 
4/30/2011 2.63% 0.85% -11.10% 4.22% 0.021370342 
5/31/2011 2.52% 5.14% -11.32% 4.57% 0.024089137 
6/30/2011 2.84% 6.08% -11.75% 5.02% 0.027889236 
7/31/2011 3.05% 0.25% -8.31% 5.26% 0.03127406 
8/31/2011 3.49% 1.56% -5.19% 5.34% 0.030556326 
9/30/2011 4.26% 2.60% 16.28% 5.69% 0.01178979 
10/31/2011 4.18% 6.03% 13.73% 6.04% 0.023363469 
11/30/2011 4.26% 2.74% 14.16% 6.12% 0.019376679 
12/31/2011 4.92% 0.00% 22.04% 6.11% 0.030179553 
1/31/2012 4.53% -6.06% 8.70% 6.26% 0.045047519 
2/29/2012 4.28% 9.03% 7.71% 6.12% 0.075950332 
3/31/2012 3.97% 1.73% 13.27% 5.96% 0.075477892 
4/30/2012 4.06% 0.44% 18.40% 6.12% 0.046340022 
      Date  Zim CPI M3 ZAR SACPI M3 + Gold 
3/31/2010 95.00 1610000000 7.29 111.10 1620947965 
4/30/2010 95.10 1750000000 7.39 111.30 1762134502 
5/31/2010 95.30 1800000000 7.67 111.50 1813468594 
6/30/2010 95.20 1900000000 7.67 111.50 1914981170 
7/31/2010 95.10 1917700000 7.30 112.20 1934259614 
8/31/2010 95.00 2040200000 7.37 112.30 2058547586 
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9/30/2010 95.10 2289500000 6.96 112.40 2309673343 
10/31/2010 95.30 2070700000 7.00 112.60 2092951321 
11/30/2010 95.70 2137800000 7.10 112.80 2162317737 
12/31/2010 95.30 2327600000 6.63 113.00 2354326587 
1/31/2011 96.10 2361900000 7.19 113.50 2390378141 
2/28/2011 96.80 2458100000 6.97 114.30 2488361377 
3/31/2011 97.50 2578200000 6.77 115.70 2610650636 
4/30/2011 97.60 2600000000 6.57 116.00 2634910405 
5/31/2011 97.70 2733600000 6.80 116.60 2771065126 
6/30/2011 97.90 2899700000 6.77 117.10 2939465443 
7/31/2011 98.00 2907000000 6.69 118.10 2949665776 
8/31/2011 98.32 2952400000 6.99 118.30 2998325745 
9/30/2011 99.15 3029300000 8.10 118.80 3078370283 
10/31/2011 99.28 3211900000 7.96 119.40 3264342587 
11/30/2011 99.78 3300000000 8.11 119.70 3355913173 
12/31/2011 99.99 3300000000 8.09 119.90 3359497627 
1/31/2012 100.45 3100000000 7.81 120.60 3164436386 
2/29/2012 100.94 3380000000 7.51 121.30 3448969540 
3/31/2012 101.37 3438600000 7.67 122.60 3512767670 
4/30/2012 101.56 3453600000 7.78 123.10 3532946985 
      Date  Zim CPI ZWD/ZAR ZAR SACPI ZWD/USD 
3/31/2010 95.00 1.3727 7.29 111.10 10 
4/30/2010 95.10 1.3534 7.39 111.30 
 5/31/2010 95.30 1.3038 7.67 111.50 
 6/30/2010 95.20 1.3036 7.67 111.50 
 7/31/2010 95.10 1.3704 7.30 112.20 
 8/31/2010 95.00 1.3561 7.37 112.30 
 9/30/2010 95.10 1.4362 6.96 112.40 
 10/31/2010 95.30 1.4288 7.00 112.60 
 11/30/2010 95.70 1.4078 7.10 112.80 
 12/31/2010 95.30 1.5085 6.63 113.00 
 1/31/2011 96.10 1.3917 7.19 113.50 
 2/28/2011 96.80 1.4350 6.97 114.30 
 3/31/2011 97.50 1.4762 6.77 115.70 
 4/30/2011 97.60 1.5224 6.57 116.00 
 5/31/2011 97.70 1.4701 6.80 116.60 
 6/30/2011 97.90 1.4773 6.77 117.10 
 7/31/2011 98.00 1.4945 6.69 118.10 
 8/31/2011 98.32 1.4303 6.99 118.30 
 9/30/2011 99.15 1.2351 8.10 118.80 
 10/31/2011 99.28 1.2563 7.96 119.40 
 11/30/2011 99.78 1.2332 8.11 119.70 
 12/31/2011 99.99 1.2361 8.09 119.90 
 1/31/2012 100.45 1.2803 7.81 120.60 
 2/29/2012 100.94 1.3322 7.51 121.30 
 3/31/2012 101.37 1.3033 7.67 122.60 





Date  Zim CPI ZWD/ZAR ZAR SACPI M3 + Gold 
3/31/2010 98.10 1.3727 7.29 111.10 1620947965 
4/30/2010 98.20 1.3534 7.39 111.30 1762134502 
5/31/2010 98.41 1.3038 7.67 111.50 1813468594 
6/30/2010 98.31 1.3036 7.67 111.50 1914981170 
7/31/2010 98.20 1.3704 7.30 112.20 1934259614 
8/31/2010 98.10 1.3561 7.37 112.30 2058547586 
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9/30/2010 98.20 1.4362 6.96 112.40 2309673343 
10/31/2010 98.41 1.4288 7.00 112.60 2092951321 
11/30/2010 98.82 1.4078 7.10 112.80 2162317737 
12/31/2010 98.41 1.5085 6.63 113.00 2354326587 
1/31/2011 99.24 1.3917 7.19 113.50 2390378141 
2/28/2011 99.96 1.4350 6.97 114.30 2488361377 
3/31/2011 100.68 1.4762 6.77 115.70 2610650636 
4/30/2011 100.79 1.5224 6.57 116.00 2634910405 
5/31/2011 100.89 1.4701 6.80 116.60 2771065126 
6/30/2011 101.10 1.4773 6.77 117.10 2939465443 
7/31/2011 101.20 1.4945 6.69 118.10 2949665776 
8/31/2011 101.53 1.4303 6.99 118.30 2998325745 
9/30/2011 102.39 1.2351 8.10 118.80 3078370283 
10/31/2011 102.52 1.2563 7.96 119.40 3264342587 
11/30/2011 103.04 1.2332 8.11 119.70 3355913173 
12/31/2011 103.25 1.2361 8.09 119.90 3359497627 
1/31/2012 103.73 1.2803 7.81 120.60 3164436386 
2/29/2012 104.24 1.3322 7.51 121.30 3448969540 
3/31/2012 104.68 1.3033 7.67 122.60 3512767670 










in Vault  Value of Gold in Vault 
Implied Value (Mkt 
Value) Surplus or Deficit  
% Chag from 







Implied Value Stratregy  Strategy 
1122 956 10949  $                       11,374,472  
 $                  
12,014,885.15   $                     640,412.98  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,276,894.72   $                     902,422.55  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,241,529.45   $                      867,057.28  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,462,699.25   $                  1,088,227.08  9%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,391,530.75  
 $                    
1,017,058.58  8%          10  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,462,480.27   $                   1,088,008.10  9%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,611,605.65   $                   1,237,133.48  10%          12  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,355,727.52   $                       981,255.35  8%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,461,932.82   $                   1,087,460.65  9%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                   
12,511,969.75  
 $                    
1,137,497.58  9%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,382,552.57   $                  1,008,080.40  8%          10  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,417,260.90   $                   1,042,788.73  8%          10  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,463,794.15   $                   1,089,321.98  9%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,167,623.70  
 $                        
793,151.53  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949 
 $                   11,374,472.17   $                  
11,978,753.45   $                     604,281.28  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
11,969,775.27   $                      595,303.10  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,026,381.60   $                      651,909.43  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,018,169.85   $                     643,697.68  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                   
11,911,964.55   $                     537,492.38  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                    
11,901,015.55   $                     526,543.38  4%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 11,838,058.80   $                     463,586.63  4%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,104,666.95   $                      730,194.78  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,202,113.05   $                     827,640.88  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,151,200.20   $                      776,728.03  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949 
 
 $                   11,374,472.17  
 
 $                 11,644,589.97   $                       270,117.80  2%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                   















































































1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
11,637,144.65   $                     262,672.48  2%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
11,804,116.90   $                     429,644.73  4%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 11,738,422.90   $                     363,950.73  3%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 11,994,301.03   $                     619,828.86  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,012,147.90   $                      637,675.73  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,053,754.10   $                      679,281.93  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,256,310.60   $                     881,838.43  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,118,900.65   $                     744,428.48  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,142,441.00   $                     767,968.83  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,254,120.80   $                     879,648.63  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,200,251.72   $                       825,779.55  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,080,360.17   $                     705,888.00  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,017,950.87   $                     643,478.70  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                   
12,111,783.80   $                       737,311.63  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,236,492.91   $                     862,020.74  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,250,288.65   $                      875,816.48  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,423,282.85   $                   1,048,810.68  8%          10  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,481,312.55   $                   1,106,840.38  9%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,395,362.90   $                  1,020,890.73  8%          10  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,426,020.10  
 $                    
1,051,547.93  8%           11  ##### 
     
11,374,472.17  Long Put 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,302,624.87   $                      928,152.70  8%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,283,135.65   $                    908,663.48  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,136,966.50   $                     762,494.33  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,148,462.95   $                      773,990.78  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,064,155.65   $                    689,683.48  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,136,419.05   $                      761,946.88  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $               12,348,063.22   $                       973,591.05  8%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,267,588.07   $                       893,115.90  7%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $               12,343,902.60   $                    969,430.43  8%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,121,090.45   $                      746,618.28  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,067,987.80   $                      693,515.63  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,100,615.82   $                      726,143.65  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 11,898,278.30   $                      523,806.13  4%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 11,939,884.50   $                      565,412.33  5%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                 12,123,280.25   $                     748,808.08  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17  
 $                  
12,150,981.22   $                      776,509.05  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
1122 956 10949  $                   11,374,472.17   $                12,082,768.95   $                     708,296.78  6%           -                -                             -    0 0 
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